BlackMatter is a new ransomware threat discovered at the end of July 2021.
BlackMatter is ransomware-as-a-service (Raas) tool that allows the ransomware’s developers to profit from cybercriminal affiliates (i.e., BlackMatter actors) who deploy it against victims. This malware started with a strong group of attacks and some advertising from its developers that claims they take the best parts of other malware, such as GandCrab, LockBit and DarkSide, despite also saying they are a new group of developers.
This malware has a great deal in common with DarkSide, the malware associated with the Colonial Pipeline attack which caught the attention of the US government and law enforcement agencies around the world. BlackMatter is a possible rebrand of DarkSide, a RaaS which was active from September 2020 through May 2021.
BlackMatter actors have attacked numerous U.S.-based organizations and have demanded ransom payments ranging from $80,000 to $15,000,000 in Bitcoin and Monero.
Using embedded, previously compromised credentials, BlackMatter leverages the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to access the Active Directory (AD) to discover all hosts on the network. BlackMatter then remotely encrypts the hosts and shared drives as they are found.
The main goal of BlackMatter is to encrypt files in the infected computer and demand a ransom for decrypting them. As with previous ransomware, the operators steal files and private information from compromised servers and request an additional ransom to not publish on the internet.
Ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure entities could directly affect consumer access to critical infrastructure services; therefore, CISA, the FBI, and NSA urge all organizations, including critical infrastructure organizations, to implement the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this joint advisory. These mitigations will help organizations reduce the risk of compromise from BlackMatter ransomware attacks.
BlackMatter is typically seen as an EXE program and, in special cases, as a DLL (Dynamic Library) for Windows. Linux machines can be affected with special versions of it too. BlackMatter is programmed in C++ and has a size of 67Kb.
The first action performed by BlackMatter is preparation of some modules that will be needed later to get the required functions of Windows.
The modules needed are
Both modules will try to get functions to reserve memory in the process heap.
BlackMatter uses some tricks to try and make analysis harder and avoid debuggers. Instead of searching for module names it will check for hashes precalculated with a ROT13 algorithm.
The APIs are searched using a combination of the PEB (Process Environment Block) of the module and the EAT (Export Table Address) and enumerating all function names. With these names it will calculate the custom hash and check against the target hashes.
The BlackMatter variant uses embedded admin or user credentials that were previously compromised and ‘NtQuerySystemInformation’ and ‘EnumServicesStatusExW’ to enumerate running processes and services, respectively.
BlackMatter then uses the embedded credentials in the LDAP and SMB protocol to discover all hosts in the AD and the ‘srvsvc.NetShareEnumAll’ Microsoft Remote Procedure Call (MSRPC) function to enumerate each host for accessible shares.
BlackMatter tries to get many privileges:
- SE_DEBUG_PRIVILEGE, SE_IMPERSONATE_PRIVILEGE
Notably, this variant of BlackMatter leverages the embedded credentials and SMB protocol to remotely encrypt, from the original compromised host, all discovered shares’ contents, including ADMIN$, C$, SYSVOL, and NETLOGON.
BlackMatter actors use a separate encryption binary for Linux-based machines and routinely encrypt ESXi virtual machines. Rather than encrypting backup systems, BlackMatter actors wipe or reformat backup data stores and appliances.
The following Snort signatures may be used for detecting network activity associated with BlackMatter activity.
Intrusion Detection System Rule:
alert tcp any any -> any 445 ( msg:”BlackMatter remote encryption attempt”; content:”|01 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 01 00|”; content:”|2e 00 52 00 45 00 41 00 44 00 4d 00 45 00 2e 00 74 00|”; distance:100; detection_filter: track by_src, count 4, seconds 1; priority:1; sid:11111111111; )
Inline Intrusion Prevention System Rule:
alert tcp any any -> any 445 ( msg:”BlackMatter remote encryption attempt”; content:”|01 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 01 00|”; content:”|2e 00 52 00 45 00 41 00 44 00 4d 00 45 00 2e 00 74 00|”; distance:100; priority:1; sid:10000001; )
rate_filter gen_id 1, sig_id 10000001, track by_src, count 4, seconds 1, new_action reject, timeout 86400
CISA, the FBI, and NSA urge network defenders, especially for critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk of compromise by BlackMatter ransomware:
1) Implement Detection Signatures
- Implement the detection signatures identified above. These signatures will identify and block placement of the ransom note on the first share that is encrypted, subsequently blocking additional SMB traffic from the encryptor system for 24 hours.
2) Use Strong Passwords
- Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts.) to have strong, unique passwords. Passwords should not be reused across multiple accounts or stored on the system where an adversary may have access. Note: devices with local administrative accounts should implement a password policy that requires strong, unique passwords for each individual administrative account.
3) Implement Multi-Factor Authentication
- Require multi-factor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
4) Patch and Update Systems
- Keep all operating systems and software up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats.
5) Limit Access to Resources over the Network
- Remove unnecessary access to administrative shares, especially ADMIN$ and C$. If ADMIN$ and C$ are deemed operationally necessary, restrict privileges to only the necessary service or user accounts and perform continuous monitoring for anomalous activity.
- Use a host-based firewall to only allow connections to administrative shares via SMB from a limited set of administrator machines.
6) Implement Network Segmentation and Traversal Monitoring
Adversaries use system and network discovery techniques for network and system visibility and mapping. To limit an adversary from learning the organization’s enterprise environment, limit common system and network discovery techniques by taking the following actions.
- Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
- Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
7) Use Admin Disabling Tools to Support Identity and Privileged Access Management
If BlackMatter uses compromised credentials during non-business hours, the compromise may not be detected. Given that there has been an observed increase in ransomware attacks during non-business hours, especially holidays and weekends, CISA, the FBI, and NSA recommend organizations:
- Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin-level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the AD level when the account is not in direct need. When the account is needed, individual users submit their requests through an automated process that enables access to a system, but only for a set timeframe to support task completion.
- Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities that run from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.
8) Implement and Enforce Backup and Restoration Policies and Procedures
- Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. This practice will ensure the organization will not be severely interrupted, have irretrievable data, or be held up by a ransom demand.
- Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted) and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.
CISA, the FBI, and NSA urge critical infrastructure organizations to apply the following additional mitigations to reduce the risk of credential compromise.
- Disable the storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory.
- Consider disabling or limiting New Technology Local Area Network Manager (NTLM) and WDigest Authentication.
- Implement Credential Guard for Windows 10 and Server 2016 (Refer to Microsoft: Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard for more information). For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light for Local Security Authority (LSA).
- Minimize the AD attack surface to reduce malicious ticket-granting activity. Malicious activity such as “Kerberoasting” takes advantage of Kerberos’ Ticket Granting service and can be used to obtain hashed credentials that attackers attempt to crack.
- Set a strong password policy for service accounts.
- Audit Domain Controllers to log successful Kerberos Ticket-Granting Service requests and ensure the events are monitored for anomalous activity.